Longer Than the World Hopes, According to the Hormuz Dependency Dashboard
For years, the world feared that Iran would seek nuclear weapons. Five months of war taught the country’s rulers that they already possessed another formidable weapon. Geography and firepower give them effective control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas typically flows. Choking this artery gives Iran’s leaders enormous leverage over their adversaries.
Iran’s enemies hope that Hormuz will prove to be a wasted asset. Chris Wright, the US energy secretary, said in May that closing Hormuz is “a card you can play once.” Gulf states are busy finding alternative export routes. Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq and Syria, believes the strait will be “an afterthought in a couple of years.”
The Economist interviewed experts and analyzed data to build the “Hormuz Dependency Dashboard” to test these claims. It points to three conclusions. First, the persistence of the Iranian threat varies by commodity and country. Second, Iran’s ability to exploit the strait will diminish but may never disappear. Third, even if the tariffs Iran can impose decrease over time, its strategic influence will not necessarily vanish in one fell swoop. In fact, its regional influence may deepen as the regime institutionalizes itself.
Chart: The Economist
Start with how much traffic through the Strait of Hormuz can be easily bypassed. Some 15 million barrels of crude oil passed through the strait daily before the war. It seems easier to divert. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which bypasses the strait by crossing the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea, carried only 1 million barrels per day (b/d) for export before the war. Today it operates at its full capacity of 7 million b/d. Approximately 5 million b/d of that is exported; the rest feeds the coastal refineries. The UAE has reached maximum capacity on its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries 1.8 million b/d, up from 1 million b/d before the war. Some 200,000 b/d flows through a smaller, once-dormant Iraqi pipeline to Türkiye. This narrows the crude oil export deficit to 10 million barrels per day. Now add the new pipelines likely to be built as a result of the war (see map). A lawyer familiar with the matter says that acquiring land poses no problems in the Gulf's command-and-control economics. The most advanced project, the UAE pipeline, will run parallel to the existing line, adding 1.8 million barrels per day by late 2027.
Map: The Economist
Iraq aims to increase its pipeline capacity to 1 million barrels per day within a year. It also plans a new one to connect its southern fields to existing routes to Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Contracts are being awarded for a $2.5 million-per-day project: this should be completed within four years, says Rahul Chaudhry of Rystad Energy, a consultancy. So by 2030, another 5 million barrels per day of crude oil could bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
But this still leaves the same amount without an alternative route. And none of these upgrades are guaranteed. Iraqi projects could be derailed by security risks and cross-border queues. Many of the pipelines they dream of never see the light of day. Tankers leaving Yanbu for Asia typically sail through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where they are vulnerable to attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Saudi crude could travel via the Suez Canal or Egypt’s Sumed pipeline. But even that route may not be safe: On July 29, a drone struck a tanker in Damietta, a port near Suez.
[Chart: Economist] Iran—or its proxies—could attack new infrastructure that it fears will diminish the Strait of Hormuz’s power. Even if an agreement is reached, the risk of attacks could still drive up insurance and financing costs for such projects.
Rerouting refined products is more difficult. Gulf states shipped nearly 5 million barrels of gasoline, diesel, and other fuels through Hormuz last year. There are no overland pipeline alternatives for these. Saudi Arabia is planning one as part of its 2 million barrel-per-day expansion to its East-West Corridor. But this is still in its early stages and will require a similar increase in capacity at Yanbu. Iraq sends 1,000 truckloads of fuel oil to Syria daily, up from 10 percent before the war, but the route is slow and expensive.
[19/08/2026 12:15 PM] Dr. Samah Al-Ulayawi: Syria has received $15 million to $20 million in transit fees from traffic since the start of the war. Building new refineries outside the Gulf will take longer than building pipelines and will cost billions of dollars.
The problem is most acute for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which Qatar exports almost exclusively. There is no LNG pipeline under construction and no feasibility studies have been published. Qatar could lay simpler gas pipelines to Oman, but they would need to carry as much gas as the four-string Nord Stream pipelines from Russia were intended to deliver to Europe. It is still unreasonable to assume that Qatar’s entire liquefaction complex would need to be rebuilt on the Arabian Sea coast. There is room for hope. Most importers can, in time, wean themselves off Hormuz supplies. A few years of higher prices could stimulate an additional 2-3 million barrels per day (b/d) from the Americas and beyond. Chinese refineries still have ample spare capacity. LNG is undergoing its fastest expansion in history. Iran’s leverage over global prices will therefore diminish before the decade ends.
The same cannot be said for its grip on its Gulf neighbors—and not only because a significant share of its energy exports will still depend on Hormuz for years to come. Many others also rely on the strait.