RECRUITMENT DETERMINANTS FOR CENTRAL AND NON-LOCAL AUDITORS: AN
ANALYTICAL ON THE TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE
الباحث الأول:
Ali Hilal Union
الباحثين الآخرين:
Ghazwan Ayad Khalid Al-Shiblawi , AliNoori AbdulzahraC
المجلة:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS REVIEW
تاريخ النشر:
26 مارس، 2023
مختصر البحث:
Purpose: The object of this analysis is to investigate empirically the determinants of
the audit selection by local or Non-local Auditor (NLA) and their effect on companies
listed on the Tehran Bourses.
Theoretical framework: The selection of a…
Purpose: The object of this analysis is to investigate empirically the determinants of
the audit selection by local or Non-local Auditor (NLA) and their effect on companies
listed on the Tehran Bourses.
Theoretical framework: The selection of an independent auditor is influenced by
numerous factors. The agency theory predicts that when firm size, debt leverage, and
staff compensation costs rise, the likelihood of electing a qualified volunteer auditor
in the ordinary general assembly will as well (Hassas Yeganeh & Heidari, 2008).
Design/methodology/approach: The study seeks to examine whether local or NLA
are chosen in companies mentioned on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The
research sample contains 108 companies listed on the Tehran Bourses between 2013
and 2019.
Findings: The findings show that the probability of contracting with a NLA decline
to a considerable degree if there is a rise in the number of local auditor (LA) regardless
of auditor rating. Also, the likelihood of choosing a NLA is lower for high-quality
financial reporting companies. Besides, if a NLA is selected, audit fees (AF) are likely
to be reduced.
Research, Practical & Social implications: Independence is a determinant of
employment for central and non-local auditors. The studies focus on auditor
independence, which non-local auditors may not have when compared to local
auditors in companies in which the government contributes to financing part of its
capital.
Originality/value: The research adds to the literature on corporate governance by
emphasizing that Board oversight is not a good alternative to auditor monitoring of
Financial Statements (FS) credibility and indicates that an auditor may have licensing
criteri
